The problem of subjective experience remains a major topic of debate amongst researchers in both the philosophy of mind and the foundations of artificial intelligence. David Chalmers has referred to this as The Hard Problem of Consciousness, since subjective experience appears to resist most attempts at a functional description. Theories involving 60Hz oscillations in the cerebral cortex, Bose condensates, and quantum collapse in microtubules have all been proffered as offering potential solutions to The Hard Problem, while some other researchers seem eager to retain an essentially dualistic world-view. This paper proposes an even more fundamental problem, potentially disturbing to both sides of the materialist / dualist divide: given that conscious organisms exist in the world, how can it be that one of those organisms happens to be you?
Introduction
Half a century ago a British mathematician raised the question of whether a formal system (such as a digital computer) which appeared to be completely lifeless could display attributes (such as reasoning and intelligence) which had previously been thought to reside purely in the human (or, at best, the animal) domain (Turing, 1950) . In the same year an American biologist and a British molecular biologist began the research that was to lead three years later to their suggestion of the double-helical structure of DNA, by which the initial development of humans (and other living organisms) is determined wholly by sequences of lifeless symbols (nucleotides) which comprise the genetic material of individuals (Watson and Crick, 1953) .
Since those early beginnings the successes of both artificial intelligence and molecular biology have been massive.
No-one today seriously doubts that machines can appear intelligent, or can learn, or can play a damn good game of chess; and even fewer seriously doubt that physical attributes such as height and physique, or an aptitude towards certain skills, or a propensity towards certain diseases, are the direct results of genetic characteristics.
Artificial Life
From these successes it is argued that the mystery of life has been solved; indeed, there turns out to be no mystery. There is no elan vital. Life turns out to be nothing more than a word to represent a number of features (movement, growth, reproduction, etc.) , each of which is ultimately describable in more fundamental terms. It is not the molecules themselves which are alive, but their organization which ultimately yields
properties which are components of life.
This view provides the philosophical basis of, and the ultimate justification for, the field of research now known as Artificial Life.
Two Problems
It is the contention of this paper that two (Dennett,1991; McCarthy, 1979) .
And yet, both of these arguments follow almost identical lines, and lead to almost identical conclusions.
In both cases, they lead to positions In brief, therefore, the differences between various streams of functionalist thought may be more apparent than real.
More often than not such differences are likely to arise only because of preconceived notions of the meanings of such words as consciousness and experience.
A Difficulty for Functionalists
Suppose the functionalist view is basically correct, and that in the near future it becomes generally accepted that, above a 
Result of the experiment
Since all answers are unacceptable, the only honest course is to reject the assumption. It therefore follows that your existence is not a result of the DNA mixing that occurred at the time of conception of Kim Smith.
Contrary Views
This is a highly unpopular (although necessary) conclusion, so let us proceed to consider some possible objections and contrary opinions.
How Could It Be Any Other Way?
The most frequent response to such problems is to say "How could it be any other way?". Given that there are conscious organisms in the world, and one of those organisms happens to be you, of course you will have a subjective point of view, i.e. the point of view of Kim Smith.
The fallacy here is hard to see, but, once seen, is very evident. The fallacy occurs in the phrase "one of those organisms happens to be you". How precisely can an organism just "happen to be you"? Could a bacterium just "happen to be you"? If so, how? And also if so, how come millions upon millions of different bacteria don't just "happen to be you"?
googol and googolplex would probably help.
Well, OK (so the argument goes), but even given that problem, it still couldn't be any other way, could it? And the answer is yes, it could be another way. The way it could be is for all the conscious organisms in the world still to be conscious, but for none of them to be you.
You are Kim Smith by chance.
This view is separate from, but very closely related to, the How Could It Be Any Other Way? View mentioned above. The idea, as far as I can make sense of it, is that you could indeed have been a bacterium alive millions of years ago in another part of the Universe, but, just by chance, you happen to be Kim Smith, a human being, alive now.
There are two problems with this. Let us suppose the view is coherent; then the probability against such an event is hard to calculate, but is so massive as to be beyond comprehension. This is the less serious of the two problems, however.
The greater problem is that this scenario, though widely believed, is totally incoherent. It is not as though we are asking, why the ball landed on 27 red, and not in any other space. In the roulette analogy, both the ball and the roulette wheel have to exist before "landing by chance" makes any sense at all. Further, had we known such things as the exact mass and speed of the ball, etc, it would have theoretically been possible to determine that it would land in 27 red.
That is not the case here. Given the assumption, it is clear that you did not exist 
3.6
The word "you" is an indexical, so there is no real problem.
The words "here" and "now" are indexicals, because their meaning is not static, but varies according to the position of the speaker in space and time respectively. It is true also in one sense that the word "you"
suffers from the same problem, because it is used at different times and different places to refer to different third person individuals.
But this does not help to solve the problem under discussion, unless the reader has missed the point.
It is senseless to look for a real, physical place that is "here"; it is equally senseless to look for a particular date and time that is "now". But in the sense in which we have been using the word you, you are always exactly Kim Smith (or, to be pedantic, have the illusion that you are Kim Smith).
Conclusion
The preceding remarks are meant to provide a challenge to those working in the fields of can do this, perhaps by pointing to some complex organizational structure also found in natural living organisms, they then face the even harder challenge of explaining who it is that has these subjective experiences.
